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Abstract 
The study described here aims to make a threefold contribution to the analysis of technology 
diffusion. First of all, it tries to offer a new approach to the study of the dynamic of 
innovation diffusion, not from the traditional perspective of the rate at which  one new 
technology is fully adopted, but the extent of the diffusion of several technologies and the 
related phenomenon of standardization. Secondly, it aims to show a broadened and 
evolutionary view of the process of technology standardization, avoiding the habitual 
determinism of conventional models of technology diffusion and lock-in. Finally, it tries to 
identify and evaluate the relationships existing between the main characteristics of industries 
and the attributes of the technology standardization processes in them. To achieve these 
goals we have developed an agent based model (ABM), using distributed artificial 
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INTRODUCTION 
Technology diffusion is a process whereby innovations, whether new products, new 
processes or new management techniques, propagate within and between economies 
(Stoneman, 1986). Although the evidence on technology diffusion is inconclusive, there 
is a broad consensus on two aspects of the process: (i) the rate at which the use or 
ownership of a technology propagates in an economy changes over time (Mansfield, 
1961 and 1968); (ii) the diffusion of new technologies follows a predictable pattern over 
time, which may be represented graphically by an S -shaped curve (Griliches, 1957; 
Mansfield, 1961; Davies, 1979; Gort and Keppler, 1982).  These demonstrated facts 
have led researchers looking at technology diffusion to focus mainly on two interrelated 
questions: firstly, why do some innovations spread more rapidly than others? And, 
secondly, why do some companies adopt a given innovation more rapidly than others? 
The focus has therefore shifted onto trying to explain both the rate at which innovations 
are adopted and the order in which these innovations are adopted. 
 
However, the literature on technology diffusion has devoted very little attention to 
another, equally interesting question: why do some innovations sometimes become 
ubiquitous and turn into  de facto standards or dominant designs, whereas other 
innovations diffuse only partially or not at all? (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997). 
Moreover, as a result of those two former questions, most research into the factors 
influencing technology diffusion  have focused on the characteristics of the  technologies 
(epidemic models, Mansfield, 1961) such as risk, returns, complexity, intellectual 
property; and on the characteristics of the adopting  firms (probit models, David, 1969), 
such as their size, capital  vintage, expected returns from the new technology, factor 
productivity, search costs, and input prices. The few sectoral studies that exist, most of 
which are empirical, generally use average characteristics of companies belonging to a 
sector, given the difficulty of obtaining sectoral data. This means that they again turn 
into an examination of how firms’ characteristics affect diffusion (Blackman, 1999). 
Moreover, their findings are inconclusive and at times even contradictory. 
 
The study described here a ims to make a threefold contribution to the analysis of 
technology diffusion. First of all, it tries to offer a new approach to the study of the 
dynamic of innovation diffusion, not from the traditional perspective of the  rate at 
which  one new technology i s fully adopted, but the  extent of the diffusion of  several 
technologies and the related phenomenon of standardization. Secondly, it aims to show 
a broadened and evolutionary
1 view of the process of technology standardization, 
                                                 
1 The main differences between the conventional or neoclassical approach to the analysis of technological 
change and the evolutionary approach adopted here basically arises from the objections of evolutionary 
economists to the way in which the (aggregate) production function is used by neoclassical economists 
and their apparent inability to explain the  processes of technological innovation (Nelson and Winter, 
1974, 1977 and 1982; Dosi, 1982; Dosi  et al., 1988).  Thus, while the neoclassical approach portrays 
technological change as a simple change in the information available on the relationship between the 
economy’s inputs and outputs (Stoneman, 1983; Gomulka, 1990), the evolutionary approach considers 
technological change to be the result of a self-referential process of evolution influenced by the prevailing 
economic, social and political institutions. According to this approach, technological development should 
be understood as a process of evolution in which alternative technologies compete with one another and 
with the dominant technology, resulting in selection of winners and losers, with considerable uncertainty 
at the outset about who these winners will be (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Given that uncertainty is 




avoiding the habitual determinism of conventional models of technology diffusion and 
lock-in. Finally, it tries to identify and evaluate the relationships existing between the 
main characteristics of industries and the attributes of the technology standardization 
processes in them. To achieve these goals we have developed an agent based model
2 
(ABM), using distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) concepts drawn from the general 
methodology of social simulation. 
 
I. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND INCREASING RETURNS TO ADOPTION 
To construct our model we expanded the scope of the so-called “informational cascade” 
models (Bannerjee, 1992; De Vany and Walls, 1996; Bikhchandani et al., 1992 and 
1998). First of all, it should be noted that new technologies appear on the market in a 
specific variety of forms, which, when they are sold directly to firms, may be 
interpreted as process innovations. Adopting a technology implies an initial choice of 
one of its multiple variants. When a number of “early adopters” decide to try out a 
variant of the technology instead of the established version, and they find it to be 
superior, the so-called “band-wagon” effect can take place, whereby later adopters 
follow the early adopters’ decision, without having made the same investment in 
learning from experience. The  “informational cascades” are defined as situations in 
which it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those going before, 
to follow the behaviour of the preceding individual without considering his own 
information. The concept is similar to that of  replicator dynamics (Schuster and 
Sigmund, 1983), a pattern which repeats itself in numerous evolutionary phenomena. 
Network externalities and other increasing returns to adoption reinforce this effect. 
 
Within the field of evolutionary theories of technological change, in recent years 
growing number of authors have focused attention on the increasing returns to adoption 
–through positive feedback– on the dynamic of technology diffusion, and in particular 
on the phenomenon of technology standardization that often derives from it. One 
outstanding reference in the literature is Arthur (1989, 1990, 1994). According to 
Arthur, most of those parts of the economy based on physical resources (agriculture, 
mining, etc.) are subject to diminishing returns. On the other hand, the parts of the 
economy that are knowledge based (e.g. technology) are broadly subject to increasing 
returns. These require major investments in research, development and tools, but once 
sales begin, production can be increased relatively cheaply. As additional units are 
produced, the unit costs continue to fall and profits increase. Moreover, as greater 
production experience is acquired, producers learn how to make additional units more 
cheaply (learning by doing) (Arrow, 1962). Greater experience is also acquired in their 
use, and users’ productivity increases (learning by using) (Sheshinsky, 1967). Positive 
externalities occur because the physical and informational networks are more valuable 
to users as they grow in size (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986; Farrell and Saloner, 
1986a and b; Economides, 1996). As the number of people adopting a given technology 
                                                                                                                                               
replaced by a search for profit “in the dark” (heuristic search routines); as a result, there is no single 
welfare maximizing equilibrium, but rather a plurality of possible equilibria:  historical accidents thus 
determine which equilibrium is reached or approached at any given time; the structure, including the 
institutions, is often made explicit in evolutionary models, so that its place in the process of technological 
change can be studied (Lipsey and Carlaw, 1998). 
2 Other common names for this discipline include: Agent-Based Simulation, Agent-Based Computational 




grows, so the uncertainty is reduced and both the users and producers perceive reduced 
risks in its adoption. Their confidence in the quality and performance of the technology 
and perception of its likelihood of continuing to be available in the future therefore 
increases (Arthur, 1991). At the same time, the increase in the number of users reduces 
information search costs (Blackman, 1999). Thus, as an alternative technology gains 
market share, potential users have an increasingly powerful incentive to adopt that 
alternative, provided they are able to exchange information with those users who 
already have the technology. Moreover, a technology that improves more quickly or is 
adopted by more agents has improved chances of survival (selectional advantage). For 
this reason it is possible to say that “competition consumes its own fuel” (Metcalfe, 
1994: 938), thereby reducing technological diversity. In terms of technological 
alternatives, “(...) technology is not chosen because it is efficient, but becomes efficient 
because it has been chosen” (Rip and Kemp, 1998: 353). According to Foster (1986: 
96), once again an S -shaped curve shows precisely how the performance of a 
technology improves relative to the effort put into its development. In practice, a large 
part of this development is the result of economies of learning, which in turn depend on 









Fig. 1. Change in the performance of a technology with its market penetration 
(adapted from Unruh, 2000) 
 
Returns are not constant with the growth in the adoption of the technology. This fact 
derives to a large extent from the increasing returns that certain technologies show 
during their development and commercialization (diffusion) phases and which can 
fortuitously accelerate their rate of improvement compared with competing alternatives. 
After a point of inflection, the possible improvements in performance are progressively 
smaller, and eventually reach a limit at which there is no further improvement even if 
new users are added (Moreau, 1999: 9; Laffond et al., 1999; Loch and Huberman, 1999: 
12). Conventional economics focus on the top part of the curve (i.e. they consider that 
what is important is the return at the long-term equilibrium). When there are increasing 
returns to adoption the same distribution of technologies and user preferences can lead 
to different structures of results, depending on the way in which things start (first mover 
advantage) (Economides, 1996: 26). Early superiority, however, is no guarantee of 
long-term suitability (David, 1989; Cowan, 1990; Nelson, 1994). Thus we see that 
apparently inferior designs can be locked into the production system in a path-












(David, 1985, 1997). Thus, one characteristic of the products or systems subject to 
increasing returns is that the way in which events unfold can be critical. Whereas other 
markets may be explained by current supply and demand, it is not possible to fully 
understand markets subject to positive feedback without knowing the historical pattern 
of technology adoption (Jaffe et al., 2000: 42; Economides, 1996: 26). 
 
II. STANDARDIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY LOCK-IN 
According to Anderson and Tushman (1990), all areas of industry advance through a 
series of technology cycles. Each of these cycles begins with a technological 
discontinuity, triggered by the emergence of a breakthrough innovation, which 
significantly advances  –by more than an order of magnitude– the state of the art 
characterizing a given industry. In terms of Foster’s (1986) curves, this discontinuity 










Fig. 2. Technological discontinuity 
(adapted from Foster, 1986) 
 
The concepts of “dominant design” and “standard” are frequently used interchangeably 
in the literature (Afuah, 1998; Schilling, 1998), although the notion of dominant design 
is broader and to some extent subsumes that of a standard (Suárez and Utterback, 1995: 
417). A standard is understood to refer to a set of technical specifications to which the 
producer adheres, whether tacitly or as a  result of a formal agreement (David, 1987). 
The process by which a dominant design or standard emerges is often considered a 
“black box”, in that a wide spectrum of factors which are difficult to identify and 
measure can interact (Lee et al., 1995; Suárez  and Utterback, 1995). This is precisely 
one of the questions to which this investigation aims to point to an answer. 
 
It is generally accepted that complex technologies often show increasing returns to 
adoption (Schilling, 1998: 269). Under these conditions the system has a multiplicity of 
stable attractors or equilibria which, expressed in terms of market share, can be 
interpreted as spontaneous standards. These are also referred to as de facto or 
unsponsored standards (David and Greenstein, 1990). Typically, these are situations in 
which none of the agents has a proprietary interest in any of the main standards and no 
Discontinuity 
Effort 




one firm is big enough to take into account the way in which its price decisions and 
technology choices could influence the actions of other sellers or users (op. cit.: 5). In 
short, spontaneous standards emerge as a result of internal market processes and not as 
the result of coordinated action by market participants. Early superiority, however, is no 
guarantee of long-term suitability (David, 1989; Cowan, 1990; Nelson, 1994a). Thus, 
given increasing returns, apparently inferior designs can be locked into the production 
system indefinitely in a historically-dependent process in which circumstantial events 
determine the winning alternative (David, 1985, 1997). It should be highlighted that the 
analysis of technological diffusion given in the literature on the phenomenon of 
technological lock-in has devoted very little attention to issues relating to the existence 
of previous alternatives or the  conditions under which new technologies are able to 
displace old ones in a technological succession (Windrum and Birchenhall, 2000). In 
addition to Arthur (1989, 1990, 1994), many other authors have portrayed the 
technology selection process as an “all or  nothing” story (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 
1997). This is a general shortcoming of technology diffusion and standardization 
models which has repeatedly been highlighted in various studies over the last decade 
(Schilling, 2002: 395; Jaffe et al., 2000: 41; W indrum and Birchenhall, 1998: 112; 
David, 1997: 36; Nelson, 1994b; David and Greenstein, 1990: 8). It seems clear that, 
rather than the deterministic view of conventional models of technology lock-in, it 
might be worth having an expanded formal view of the process of technology diffusion 
and standardization which takes into account the possibility of a technological 
succession
3, understood as a series of replacements of old technologies by new 
technologies performing the same basic function (Grübler, 1990, 1991). 
 
III. THE MODEL 
 In the last few years simulation has become a popular means of discovering and 
exploring complex natural and social systems (Hannerman and Patrick, 1997).  The 
recognition that social and economic phenomena frequently exhibit characteristics 
typical of complex systems  –significant non-linearity among them– is a challenge to 
traditional research methods (Holland, 1998; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Latané, 1996; 
Gilbert, 1995). Thus, simulation has been put forward as a new way of conducting 
research, a “third scientific discipline” (Ilgen and Hulin, 2000; Axelrod, 1997) that 
complements and is built on the traditional methods of induction and deduction.  An 
important branch of simulation in the social sciences is agent based modelling (ABM), 
which is a form of modelling characterized by a number of autonomous agents which 
interact with one another and with their environment, with little or no central 
coordination (Conte et al., 1997; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999; 
Weiss, 1999).  Thus, the emergent properties of an ABM (i.e. the system’s macro-
behaviour) are the results of bottom-up processes (arising from micro-level interactions 
between agents in the system) rather than of top-down processes. According to 
Wooldridge and Jennins (1995), in an ABM the agents are computational processes that 
are characterized by: i. their autonomy, in that they control their own actions; ii. social 
                                                 
3 As will be seen below, our methodological approach to the problem being examined does not follow the 
path set by the few formal mathematical models that have attempted to elucidate the process whereby a 
technology is replaced by multiple alternatives (Peterka and Fleck, 1978; Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 
1979) and, obviously, it also departs from binary models of technology replacement (Fisher and Pry, 
1971). For this reason, in order to ensure a clearer and more direct exposition of our approach, we have 




abilities, i.e. the agents interact with one another by means of some kind of “language”; 
iii. reactivity, in that the agents can perceive their environment and respond to it; and iv. 
proactivity, in that they are able to carry out actions in order to achieve an objective. 
Clearly, to a large extent, agents in the business world exhibit these characteristics, a 
fact making ABM seem an appropriate methodology for studying emergent phenomena 
in markets. It should be highlighted that although ABM uses simulation its goal is not 
necessarily to represent a specific empirical application precisely, but rather to give us a 
more detailed understanding of the fundamental processes that may emerge in various 
applications. If this is the aim, what is important is the simplicity of the assumptions and 
not a detailed representation of a particular reality (Axelrod, 1997). 
 
Building on the ABM research methodology, this section describes the model put 
forward to achieve the aims and compare the hypotheses of the investigation. Its 
calibration, verification and validation are also discussed. 
 
III.a ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
We assume an indefinite time horizon of  t periods in which time evolves discretely 
(t˛¥ ) and the dynamic is asynchronous. We assume a single good or service  X , 
which may be produced using multiple alternative technologies  ( ) 1,...,,..., jt TjJJ = , 
the characteristics of which are defined below. In each period t the free entry of one or 
more new individual producers  ( ) 1,...,,..., it PiII =
4 of  X  takes place in a Poisson-type
5 
random process with an average rate of appearance of new producers in a given period 
0 P l > , which for simplicity we assume to be constant over time. Thus the probability 
that  t I  new producers emerge in the period t will be given by the probability function 












=    1,2, t II = K         [1]  
Each  i P has an intrinsic survival parameter  i s  associated with it ( 0 > ). For simplicity 
this parameter is assumed to remain constant over time. In this simulation it is 
distributed independently at random between the different  i P in a way that follows a 
normal distribution  ( ) , s Ns s . Thus, in each  t  there is also the  free exit of producers 
whose survival period has expired, with the rest remaining in the following period as 
old producers.  
 
                                                 
4 Assuming a finite number of agents in the industry responds to one of the criticisms of Arthur’s model, 
such as that raised by Dalle (1995) who questions the validity of “(...) assuming the existence of an 
infinite number of agents, as unanimity is not found except at the limit, making the time and therefore the 
number of agents tend to infinity. It seems to us that economic systems are constructed rather of a finite 
number of agents, who comprise a network and make use of local channels of information to enable them 
to make their decisions.” 
5 The assumption of a Poisson distribution is realistic and is well established in the literature for situations 
in which numerous successive events (in this case, the entry of firms in the sector) have independent 




We assume that in each period  t one or more new alternative technologies appear on 
the market  ( ) 1,...,,..., jt TjJJ =  in a way that cannot be anticipated by the agents 
producing the good  X . These process innovations are provided by multiple technology 
suppliers
6, who act motivated by the pursuit of a patent which grants them a certain 
degree of monopoly power, albeit temporarily. We will suppose that these technologies 
arise following a Poisson-type
7 random process, with  0 T l >  constant over time
8. 












=   1,2, t JJ = K         [2] 
It is assumed that any technology  j T  which has not been adopted at any time  t by at 
least  ( ) 0 T P >  producers  –in accordance with the mechanisms described below– after 
( ) 0 T t >  periods have passed, is considered to have been “rejected” by the productive 
system and as of that point in time is no longer available.
9 We also assume that each  j T  
can be characterized according to a set of criteria or characteristics 
j
k C  which allow 
their performance
10 to be measured from  K  different dimensions. Following Rogers 
(1995)
11, we propose the following technology characterization, although the number of 
criteria and their definition does not affect  the main results of this model, the multi-
dimensionality of the evaluation being the only genuinely important assumption
12: 
                                                 
6  According to Kemp (1997: 221) process innovations are generally developed by specialist suppliers, 
research institutions other than the producer firms, whereas product innovations are usually developed by 
the firms themselves. The model presented here deals with the diffusion of the first of these types of 
innovation: new technologies which substantially modify production processes. 
7 As done, for example, by Silveberg and Lehnert (1993), (1994). 
8 In this way the model overcomes another of the habitual criticisms of Arthur’s model: “(...) a somewhat 
unconvincing hypothesis is usually adopted in technology competition models. In Arthur’s model, for 
example, competing technologies appear simultaneously in a virgin market. It would seem more realistic 
to consider a new technology entering a market dominated by one or more well-established technologies” 
(Moreau, 1999: 8). 
9 “Those technologies that are not pre-selected or fail to slot into the system (...) are destined to fail and 
will not survive”  (Arentsen et al., 1999: 9). This assumption could easily be relaxed if we accept that the 
new technologies that emerge in each period are “improved versions” of technologies which have been 
rejected by the market. This could give rise to the introduction into the model of the issue of learning by 
doing and learning by using in R&D (Jaffe  et al., 2000: 44) and the “quality ladders” models (Sala-i-
Martin, 1994: 113). 
10  According to David and Greenstein (1990:  30), performance-oriented specifications are generally 
preferable to design-oriented specifications, especially in the development of anticipatory standards. 
11  Following the main reference in the literature on this topic, Rogers (1995: 206), the attributes of an 
innovation perceived by its potential users explain to a large extent the rate of adoption of that innovation. 
According to this author, between 49 and 87 per cent of the variation in the adoption rate is explained by 
just five attributes: the relative advantage is the extent to which an innovation is perceived as being better 
than the idea that preceded it (the perception of the relative advantage of an innovation is positively 
related to its adoption rate); the compatibility is the extent to which an innovation is perceived as being 
consistent with existing values, past experience and the needs of potential adopters (this perception is 
positively related to the rate of adoption); the complexity is the extent to which an innovation is perceived 
as being relatively difficult to understand and use (this perception is negatively related to the adoption 
rate); the trialability is the extent to which an innovation can be tried on a limited basis (a perception that 
is positively related to the adoption rate); the  observability is the extent to which the results of an 
innovation are visible to others (positively related to the adoption rate). With regard to the sustainability, 
see section 6 of this paper. 
12  The traditional approach to the decision to invest in a technology (adoption) has focused on the 




Ak C : Adoptability criteria 
1 A C  – Relative advantage 
2 A C  – Compatibility 
3 A C  – Complexity 
4 A C  – Trialability 
5 A C  – Observability 
 
Thus, each  j T  can be characterized by a performance vector 




                             [3] 
with elements  [ ] 0,1 k C ˛ , where the values 0 and 1 represent the extremes of a “bad” or 
“good” evaluation of its performance, respectively, within this continuous range. In this 
way  the proposed classification system allows a virtually unlimited number of 
alternative technologies  j T  for the production of the good  X  to be characterized. 
Obviously, in reality this would be beyond the cognitive limits, and  indeed the physical 
limits, of technological development. However, it demonstrates the flexibility of the 
proposed model compared with those
13 that centre their analysis on only two alternative 
technologies. In the simulation we also establish that, due to  the presence of increasing 
returns to adoption (deriving from learning by doing and learning by using, network 
effects, economies of scale, increasing returns to information and technology 
interrelations) the real value of each  k C  (actual performance) for each  j T  evolves as a 
function of the degree of adoption by  i P producers (installed user base).  Where 
j
kt C  is 
the value of the actual performance of  j T  in  k C  in  t. As, in fact, the five individual 
selection criteria proposed are met, in the proposed range of values (range [0-bad,1-
good]), we assume that 
j
Ikt C  is an increasing function of the number of agents  i P that 
adopt the technology  j T  in each t, 
jj














￿￿ Øø +-￿ ￿￿ Œœ ºß Łł
`￿
`￿
      [4] 
This is an increasing logistic function
14 (Figure 3) with an upper asymptote at the 
maximum level of performance 
j
Ak C `￿  or “frontier of improvement”  which cannot be 
                                                                                                                                               
widely accepted that the performance of a technology is a multi-dimensional construct (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990:  627; Foray and Grübler, 1990; Suárez and Utterback, 1995:  418; Rogers, 1995:  206; 
Kemp, 1997: 88; Christensen, 1997; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998: 114; Nelson, 2000: 70; Cantner and 
Hanusch, 2001: 229). Therefore, it would seem to be reasonable to asume that business people make their 
technology adoption decisions bearing in mind multiple dimensions or attributes of a technology, 
evaluating their (albeit imperfect) perceptions of them according to their (heterogeneous) preferences 
regarding each dimension or attribute. 
13  See, for example, Arthur (1983, 1988, 1989); Laffond et al.  (1999); Farrell and Saloner (1986); Shy 
(1996); Cowan (1988). 
14 As argued in section 3, according to Foster (1986: 96), an S-shaped curve shows precisely how the performance of 




exceeded by each criterion of a technology, despite the accumulation of new adopters. 
0
j
Ak C  represents the starting level of performance ( 0
j
t I = ) of  j T  in 
j





Ak Ak CC > `￿  is always fulfilled, both variables being distributed randomly 
and independently between the different technologies arising in the same period  t 





 is set for 
0
j










Fig. 3. Function showing the evolution of the performance of a technology as its adoption grows 
 
The variable  ( ) 0 j r > represents the rate at which  j T  improves as a result of the presence 
of increasing returns to adoption
16. For simplicity, we will assume that the value of this 
rate of improvement  j r  is common to all the criteria of  a given technology, although it 
is probable that in reality some technologies will improve more rapidly than others as 
the number of users increases. However, the model does incorporate the fact that the 
various alternative technologies will enjoy different degrees of increasing returns to 
                                                                                                                                               
result of economies of learning, which in turn depend on the level of adoption and the experience of 
users. Many authors use similar functions:  Loch and Huberman (1999: 12); Windrum and Birchenhall 
(2000: 12); Frenken and Verbart (1998). 
15  According to Kemp (1997:  273), “Numerous historical studies show that, at the moment of its 
introduction, new technologies were frequently underdeveloped in terms of their performance 
characteristics and offered scant advantages over existing technologies. They needed to be improved, both 
in terms of price and technical features, in order to spread more widely.” According to Rosenberg and 
Frischtak (1983: 147), “new inventions are typically very primitive at the time of their emergence. Their 
performance is generally poor compared with the (alternative) technologies that exist and with their future 
performance.” 
16 It should be highlighted that despite the fact that the increasing returns are different (deriving from 
learning by using and learning by doing, economies of scale, increasing returns to information and 
technological interrelations), they are usually handled together mathematically (Nelson, 1995: 74; David 
and Greenstein, 1990: 6; Cabral, 1987; Metcalfe, 1994: 937) 
Performance (
j
Akt C )  
Adoption (
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adoption. Thus, in the simulation  ( ) 0 j r >
17 is distributed randomly and independently 
between the various different  j T  emerging in the same t following an  ( ) , r Nr s . 
 
We assume the information in this technology market to be imperfect, such that each 
potential adopter has a different  perceived performance of each technology in terms of 
his own individual selection criteria
18. 
ij
Akt C  is the perceived value of the performance of 
technology  j T  by agent  i P according to the criterion  Ak C  at time  t. In the simulation 
we assume that 
ij
Akt C  is distributed between the different agents, within the range of 
possible values  [ ] 0,1 , according to a normal distribution
19 with its average at the actual 
value 
j
Akt C  and a standard deviation of 
j
Akt s :  ( ) ,
ijjj
AktAktAkt CNC s : , where 
j
Akt s  is a 
decreasing function of the number o f agents adopting technology  j T  at a given moment 
t, 
jj











          [5] 




  incorporates in the model the fact that as the number of users increases, so the 
uncertainty and information search costs decrease, and agents’ knowledge
20 of the 
actual performance of a technology, and their expectations of it increase
21.  This 
characterization of the process of diffusion of knowledge, which depends on the number 
                                                 
17 Also, in the simulation, a value of  0 r < , for all  j T , would allow us to represent a situation 
characterized by decreasing returns to adoption, whereas with  0 r =  (and  0 r s = ), for all  j T , we would 
be in a situation of constant returns to adoption. 
18 Rogers (1995: 206) argues that the perceived attributes of an innovation, as seen by its potential users, 
to a large extent explain the rate of adoption of the innovation. Frenken and Verbart (1998) point out that 
the return on the adoption of a technology probably depends on its perceived utility when a certain task is 
performed or a particular problem solved. 
19 Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993). 
20 We argued above that as the number of people adopting a given technology grows, so the uncertainty is 
reduced and both the users and producers perceive reduced risk. Their confidence in the quality and 
performance of the technology and perception of its likelihood of continuing to be available in the future 
therefore increases (Arthur, 1991).  At the same time, the increase in the number of users reduces 
information search costs (Blackman, 1999). 
21 Before deciding whether or not to adopt a technology alternative, the potential users have limited and 
imperfect information about its actual performance.  It is a generally accepted fact that agents’ 
expectations regarding the diffusion of a technology affect their decision to acquire it or invest in it (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985:  426; Farrell and Saloner, 1986:  941; David:  and Greenstein, S., 1990:  7; Loch and 
Huberman, 1999; Mulder et al., 1999: 9). Despite this consensus, most models of technological change 
use the change in actual performance of the technologies in question as a fundamental axis of their 
dynamic (unless they consider it constant).  The model proposed here takes an alternative and more 
realistic approach by focusing on the changing perceptions potential users have of the real performance of 
the technological alternatives.  As happens in the real world, in the model these perceptions of a 
technology improve with market experience, and come closer to the actual performance as the number of 





22, acts as a self-reinforcing factor in the interest of agents  i P in the technology 
j T , whose actual performance benefits from the number of users 
j
t I   itself, is an 
accurate representation of the bandwagon effect defined earlier. 
 
In random time intervals, using a stochastic process of replacement of obsolete 
technologies
23, each of the (new and old) producers  i P active in the market in period  t 
decides individually. This means that, as will be discussed below, each producer can 
either decide to continue with the last technology he decided to install or adopt a new 
one from the  j T  available in the period concerned.  For this purpose, in the simulation 
each active agent  i P at each time  ( ) 0 t >  is assigned a replacement parameter 
i
t ro  which 
takes a value of 1 (replacement) or 0 (continuation) according to a Bernoulli probability 
distribution  b  within the group of agents active in that same period. The greater or 
lesser magnitude of the parameter  b  allows the model to represent industries with a 
greater or lesser tendency to technological obsolescence a nd/or industries in which 
technological change involves higher or lower costs. 
 
An agent can be considered to have bounded rationality regarding various aspects of the 
problem, such as his ability to calculate or access to all the information he needs to 
make a decision.  In this model it is possible to argue that despite his imperfect 
information, the individual agent may  try to optimize the problem of individual choice. 
In other words, we assume that each  Pi has bounded rationality in terms of access to 
information, but that given the decision scale he acts as if he were optimizing his private 
decisions
24. Let us also suppose that  i P agents have heterogeneous preferences 
regarding the adoption characteristics 
j
Ak C  of the productive technologies. Thus, in each 
t, each  i P adopts
25 the  j T  that offers the greatest value in terms of the linear decision
26 
function  ( ) 0
i
t U > : 
Max  1A1t2A2t3A3t4A4t5A5t
iiijiijiijiijiij
t UwCwCwCwCwC =￿+￿+￿+￿+￿      [10] 
                                                 
22 Responding to Dalle’s (1995) criticism of Arthur’s model, the model suggested here does not require 
that the potential adopter know the exact number of users of each technology, but rather it incorporates 
the advantage of the technology with the greater number of users by means of a function reflecting its 
better actual performance [4] and a function incorporating the lesser uncertainty [5] surrounding this 
performance in the performance perceived by the producers. 
23 David and Greenstein, 1990: 6. 
24 According to Nelson (1995: 50), “there is no real difference between saying that companies literally 
maximize and saying that their behaviour has been learned through trial and error, and in some cases they 
have been selected by the competitive process. In this way, agents act ‘as if’ they were maximizing.” 
Using this approximation, for example, Loch and Huberman (1999:  5) assume that “(...)  agents are 
governed by profits but are unable to optimize due to their bounded rationality. [On this assumption] 
agents simply choose the ‘best’ of the technologies available, without being able to conduct a full 
evaluation or anticipate the equilibrium of the system.” 
25 In other words, each agent adheres to a “technology population” in Saviotti’s sense (2001: 200), which 
evolves in quantitative terms (size) and qualitative terms (composition). 
26  We apply a simple method of weighted (linear) summation (see, for example, Pomerol and Barba-




where the parameters  ( ) 01
ii ww <<  are the weightings the agent  i P attributes to the 
various criteria involved in his decision. In the simulation we assume that for each  i P 
the weightings are normalized, i.e. the condition  1
i w = ￿  is met; additionally, we 
assume that the values of each of the weightings 
i w  that each  i P attributes to each 
criterion is distributed independently and randomly between the different producers  i P 
following a  ( ) 0,1 N  distribution within the range of possible values  [ ] 0,1 .  We assume 
that the value of these weightings, which constitute the preference profile of  each agent 
i P, do not change over the course of the agent’s active life. Nevertheless, the average 
weightings assigned by the  group of active agents in each  t do change, given that the 
group changes (quantitatively and qualitatively) as agents enter and leave the market.  
 
Lastly, we define as the standard or dominant technology in  t that 
jST
t T  which achieves 
a market share  %
jST
t jII > ￿ , for  2 t J >  technologies
27, for at least 
ST t  periods. We 
define as a “challenging technology” in  t that 
jR
t T  which first exceeds the market share 
of 
jST
t T , once the latter has ceased to be the standard. Here,  r t  (replacement time) is the 
moment at which 
jR
t T  replaces 
jST
t T  (by exceeding its market share). 
j
t F  is the actual 
fitness
28 of technology  j  at time  t, defined as 
j
Akt AkCAk ￿ . 
ij
t F  is the perceived 
fitness of technology j  (i.e. the average perception of the  i users of this technology) at 
time t, defined as  ( )
ijj
Aktt iAk CAkI Øø ºß ￿￿ . 
 
Table 1 recaps the (independent) variables used in the model to characterize the industry 
represented and the attributes of the technology standardization process (dependent 









                                                 
27 In the simulation, this condition (for  2 t J >  technologies) will only apply in the initial moments after 
the emergence of the industry given that with a small number of technologies (<2) the fact that one of 
them obtains more than 50% of adopters may be the result of chance (first mover advantage) rather than 
its merit. However, if later on while one technology is dominant the others reduced their share or 
disappeared altogether, it would not make sense to say that the non-fulfilment of the condition (for  2 t J >  
technologies) caused the technology in question to lose its recognition as the standard, given that it had 
obtained it by its own merits. 
28 Nelson (1995: 64) defines the ‘fitness’ of a technology as its ability to resolve a specific technology 
problem better; Saviotti (2001: 207) defines it as the technology’s ability to adapt to the environment in 




Table 1. Recap of the variables and parameters of the model 
Characteristics of the industry (independent variables used in the model) 
Parameter  Definition and interpretation 
T l   Average rate at which new available technologies appear during the 
period in the industry (“average rate of innovation”). 
T P   Minimum number of adopters the technology needs to obtain within time 
T t  in order to survive (“scale of network” necessary). 
T t   Maximum time in which a technology needs to obtain  T P   adopters in 
order to survive (“competitiveness of the technology market”) 
r   Average rate of improvement with the adoption of technologies  j T  
emerging within the same period  t  (“degree of increasing returns to 
adoption”) 
r s   Dispersion of the average rate of improvement with the adoption of 
technologies  j T  emerging within the same period  t  (“degree of 
differentiation in the capabilities of the technology providers”) 
P l   Average rate at which new active producers appear in each period 
(“barriers to entry”). 
s  “Average survival of firms” 
s s   Dispersion of the average survival of firms (“competitiveness of the 
industry”) 
c   “Rate of communication” between users 
b   Probability that an agent  i  replaces his technology  j  at time  t  
(“tendency to technological obsolescence in the industry”; “cost of 
technological change in the industry”). 
ST% I   Minimum market share  –in terms o f the relative number of adopters– that 
a technology needs to achieve during 
ST t  periods in order to be considered 
the industry’s “standard” technology. 
ST t
  Minimum time a technology needs to maintain the minimum market share 
ST% I  in order to be considered the industry’s “standard” technology. 
 
Attributes of the technology standardization process (dependent variables) 
Variable  Definition and interpretation 
ST
0 t   Emergence: for each simulation, the initial moment  t  in which a technology 
exceeds a share 
ST% I  of the active users (for  2 t J > ) for at least 
ST t  periods, 
thus becoming the standard. 
ST fr   Frequency: the number of times the above event occurs over the course of 
each simulation. 
jST v   Speed: for each standard, the time elapsing in the experiment between the 
entry of a technology in the market and its acceptance as a standard. 
jST d   Duration: for each standard, the time elapsed (greater than 
ST t  periods) 
during which a technology’s share of users remains above 
ST% I  (for  t J>2). 
jST p   Depth: for each standard, the maximum share achieved by the technology 




during the time it remains the standard. 
jST dco   Susceptibility to changes in supply: for each standard, the magnitude of 
improvement necessary in the perceived performance of an alternative 
technology to break its dominance (percentage variation b etween 
ijR
t F  and 
ijST
t F  at time  r t ). 
jST dcd   Susceptibility to changes in demand: for each standard, the magnitude of the 
change in preferences of the users needed to break the dominance of a 
standard technology. 
jR iI "˛ ,   1 (,...,)
i ii















jST iI "˛ ,   1 (,...,)
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AkAk k dcdabab =￿=￿ ￿
rr
  at time  r t  
 
Other model dependent variables 
Variable  Definition and interpretation 
ST
jST
t F   Actual fitness of the technology standard  j  at the time  ST t  when it becomes 
the standard. Defined as 
,
jST
Akt AktSTCAk ￿ . 
ST
jBAT
t F   Actual fitness of the technology that would have been the best alternative 
technology  j , (simultaneously or beforehand) a standard in the  ST t  moment 
at which it becomes the standard as such and is adopted by an equivalent 
number of users. Defined as  
,
jBAT
Akt AktSTCAk ￿ . 
 
III.b CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL 
Given our interest in its dynamic properties and the difficulty of its mathematical 
treatment, the agent based model (ABM) described has been developed to run in 
MATLAB
TM, a specific mathematics-oriented programming language, recognized for 
its capabilities and versatility.
29  In keeping with the philosophy of ABM, we have 
                                                 
29  Our model has been designed to make it straightforward for the analyst to enter the starting-point 
conditions of the experiment. It is possible to modify the magnitudes of the initial parameters describing 
the industry (rate of innovation, barriers to entry, rate of increasing returns, etc.) and the general 
conditions of the experiment (number of dimensions of the technology, number of iterations per 
simulation and number of simulations per experiment).  It also allows a random seed to be saved and 
reused under different conditions.  As well as experimenting with a “ base scenario”, it is possible to 
perform multiple sensitivity analyses on the various parameters of the model.  Finally, this model 
generates a wide range of graphics and numerical tables recording the paths taken and giving details of 




sought to use this flexibility to provide a research methodology to enhance our 
understanding of the basic processes which might appear in various applications, and 
not represent or make specific predictions regarding a particular empirical application. 
Thus, when calibrating the model (base scenario) we opted for a set of theoretically 
acceptable parameters obtained from the literature, but which are not intended to 
represent precisely any particular situation or industry. The subsequent sensitivity 
analysis will make it possible to evaluate statistically the effect of modifications on this 
base scenario. 
 
As regards  
ST I % , Anderson and Tushman (1990) consider a dominant design 
(standard) to have emerged when a new architecture obtains 50% or more of the 
installed processes
30 and maintains this market share for at least 3 consecutive years
31. 
Various studies of different industries in a number of countries (Klepper and Simons, 
1997; Gort and Klepper, 1982) confirm that a value of 15 for the parameter  P l  may be 
theoretically acceptable for the base scenario. As regards the parameters  s and  s s , 
studies such as those by Klepper and Simons (1997), Mata and Portugal (1994) or 
Tegarden  et al. (2000) suggest that values in the base scenario for  s and  s s  of 5 and 2 
years, respectively, are of a theoretically acceptable order of magnitude.  Klepper and 
Simons (1997) also offer guidance as to an approximate magnitude for  T l . In the base 
scenario we have opted for a value of 1. 
 
Unlike the previous parameters, which are populational,  and whose magnitudes can be 
justified from empirical studies, the way the underlying assumptions were decided for 
the remainder of the initial parameters in the model was more ad hoc. Where possible, 
we have sought to justify the values used on the basis o f the preceding values. In this 
way, given the magnitude (justified) of the entry and exit of firms to and from the 
industry, which leads the industry to stabilize in the base scenario with a population of 
almost 80 firms which are constantly being renewed, we believe it reasonable that a 
technology should be adopted by at least 5 firms ( T P ) within 2 years ( T t ) in the base 
scenario in order for it not to be considered “rejected” by the productive system and for 
network economies to come into play, allowing it to compete with the other 
technologies. Given this value of  T P , if we ascribe a value of 0.2 to the maximum 
dispersion 
j
Akt s   of the perceived performances 
ij
Akt C  around the actual performance of a 
technology 
j
Akt C  ( [ ] 0,1 ˛ ), according to expression [5] the rate of communication  c  
should have a value of 0.8. In the same way, if the maximum values that can be 
achieved by 
j
Ak C `￿  and 
0
j
Ak C  are 1 and 0.5, respectively, from expression [4] we can 
deduce that a rate  r  of around 0.5 places the “frontier of technological improvement” at 
approximately 50% in an industry of 80 firms. In other words, we are assuming that 
only one technology standard can reach its full performance potential, which, at all 
                                                                                                                                               
code of the model can, of course, be requested from the author, together with the technical details of the 
modular structure of the program, the names and descriptions of the model’s variables, and the routines it 
contains. 
30 This condition can obviously only be obtained by one technology at any time  . 




events, is limited (<1). We also establish a deviation  r s = 0.2 to ensure a certain degree 
of diversity between the technological alternatives.  
 
Lastly, the value of 0.2 assigned to  b (probability that agent  i  replaces his technology 
j  at time  t ) in the model is justified by the relative tendency to technological 
obsolescence and the considerable costs of technological change in the industry. 
 
III.c NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
In order to fulfil the aims of the investigation and check the hypotheses set out below, 
we ran an experiment using the base scenario, involving 150 simulations of 50 iterations 
each, using different random seeds in each simulation
32. As a sample, and for reasons of 
space, Appendix 1 presents only the first 10 simulations of all the standards recorded in 
each simulation. The table in the appendix shows the different characteristics of each of 
the standards, and the complete standardization process, recorded in each “history” 
(simulation) of this industry, according to the attributes described above (time, 
frequency, speed, duration, depth, susceptibility to changes in supply a nd in changes in 
demand).  Appendix 2 shows the data for the first standard recorded in each simulation, 
filtered out from the general results of the 150 simulations. The characteristics of these 
standards will be examined in more detail below
33. 
 
The set of graphs included in Appendix 3 shows the results of a typical model 
simulation using the base scenario. The first graph shows the time course of the 
adoption (market shares as a unit proportion) of the technologies by the various 
producers present in each  moment in the industry producing good  X. Following 
Anderson and Tushman (1990), technologies that exceed a 50% share for at least 3 
periods are identified as technology standards
34. The last two graphs show the evolution 
                                                 
32 To decide on the appropriate number of simulations in the main experiment we first ran a pilot in which 
15 simulations were run on the base scenario with different random seeds. This pilot experiment yield 
standard deviations of  s  for the variables
ST
jST
t F , 
ST
jBAT
t F ,  jST dco ,  jST dcd ,  das  and dac , involved in the 
hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4. When a confidence of 95% was required (za = 1.96), for reasonable 
amplitude intervals of  d , the variable requiring the largest sample  n  was  jST dco , which required a 
sample of around 70 cases of at least one standard (see the following note), an objective that in our base 






















As regards the choice of 50 iterations per simulation, this number was selected because it was considered 
a sufficiently distant horizon to enable the phenomenon of a series of successive standards to be studied. 
A remoter horizon did not yield different conclusions, but required more computation time in the 
experiments. 
33 We consider the first standard to be representative of the characteristics of the rest of the standards in 
the same simulation, and given that it is the one produced in the greatest number of simulations, its choice 
ensures the greatest number of data.  Those standards that emerge at the start of the experiment and 
continue to dominate through to the end are considered outliers and discarded. 
34  The number next to the word “standard” (simulator otputs in spanish: “estándar”) identifies the 




of the population of firms and the p opulation of technologies, respectively. It is worth 
highlighting the striking visual isomorphism between the results of the model and the 
patterns of the phenomenon observed in real industries as, according to Marney and 
Tarbert (2000), this may be considered an indicator of the validity of the model. In a test 
of  external validity, as understood by Kleijnen (1998), in Appendix 4 it is possible to 
see that our model offers a representation of the phenomenon of technological 
succession consistent with the e mpirical evidence on the diffusion of technologies in 
industries as diverse as RAM chips, steel manufacturing or power generation. 
 
Unlike conventional models of technology diffusion and standardization, which focus 
on the  rate at which  one new technology  diffuses until it is fully adopted, our model 
enables a broader approximation to the process of technological change to be obtained, 
from the perspective of the  extension of the diffusion of  multiple alternative 
technologies and the related phenomenon of s tandardization. Previously, we pointed out 
that in addition to Arthur, many other authors have portrayed the technology selection 
process as an “all or nothing” story (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997). This is a 
general shortcoming of diffusion and standardization models that has been pointed out 
repeatedly in various studies over the last decade (Schilling, 2002: 395; Jaffe  et al., 
2000: 41; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998: 112; David, 1997: 36; Nelson, 1994b; David 
and Greenstein, 1990: 8). Despite the various forces ( positive feedbacks) that help 
reinforce the dominant position of a technology standard, experience shows that no 
standard remains in place in an industry indefinitely (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 
1997; Ruttan, 1997; Witt, 1997; Grübler, 1990; Ausubel, 1989). On the contrary, in 
reality, if a long enough horizon is taken, one sees a succession of standards, a dynamic 
of transition between unstable equilibria, which this model is able to represent and 
characterize. 
 
It is rare for a technology standard to achieve absolute diffusion in an industry, where 
this is understood to mean a 100% market share. By contrast, one often observes how 
different degrees of standard coexist with less successful technological alternatives, 
which may survive for a variable length of time in market niches (Grübler, 1990; Dalle, 
1995; Freeman, 1996). The existence of these niches is explained both by the 
emergence of new alternatives, which start to build their own installed user base, and by 
the heterogeneity of users’ preferences, which may circumstantially maintain different 
groups apart from the dominant standard. Again, the proposed model makes it possible 
to show in greater detail than conventional “all-or-nothing” models (which, moreover, 
usually focus on the competition between just two alternatives) the reality of an industry 
divided at all times between multiple available alternatives, all with different levels of 
adoption at each moment in time. 
 
IV. EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESES 
It was argued above that in the presence of increasing returns to adoption the market 
may become locked-in in favour of one of the competing alternatives due to historical 
circumstances. It is a recurring statement in the literature on this issue that under these 
conditions there is no  guarantee that there are no alternatives to the winning technology 
that would have had lower unit costs if they had achieved an equivalent position of 




Moreover, throughout this paper we have maintained that the technology path followed 
by an industry is shaped by chance historical events ( path dependency). Thus we can 
state that the distribution of market shares between the different technological 
alternatives at any given time, and the succession of possible technological standards, 
will depend on the one hand on the chance order in which these alternatives are 
available for adoption and that in which the potential adopters enter and exit the 
industry. It will also depend on the characteristics of each of these heterogeneous 
“populations” (technologies and firms) at each time (performances and preferences, 
respectively). 
 
Hypothesis 1. In an industry characterized by increasing returns to technology 
adoption, over a sufficiently long time horizon, we will witness a succession of 
multiple alternative equilibria (standards), which cannot be anticipated and are not 
necessarily Pareto-optimal. 
 
Proof. In the table of general results in Appendix 1 it is possible to see how the 
different “histories” of the industry represented by the various simulations do indeed 
show alternative technological paths which cannot be anticipated in advance. The data 
in column 2 of the table (ID_ST, identifier of standard  j) show that in the various 
simulations (SIM is  the number of the simulation) different standards emerge, each of 




 (columns 5 to 9). 
Under the same initial conditions, with an identical base scenario, the element of chance 
in the evolution of the populations of technologies and adopters (order of entry and exit, 
characteristics, preferences, etc.) leads the different simulations (“histories” of the 
industry) to different standard technologies in each case.  Clearly, these paths of 
technological change cannot be anticipated by the agents participating in the industry, as 
their course depends on unpredictable events. In this respect the model presented here 
overcomes the determinism to which the traditional assumptions leads and  allows this 
theoretical exercise to be performed in a way which shows how different sequences of 
events in the same industry can lead to different technology paths. 
 
With regard to the second part of Hypothesis 1, the possible non-Pareto-optimal nature 
of  the equilibria (standards) arrived at implies that as a result of the presence of 
increasing returns to adoption, uncoordinated adoption decisions by mutually influenced 
producers may lead the industry, in a dynamic conditioned by the way events unfold, to 
an inferior technology standard than that which could have been achieved had they 
chosen one of the available alternatives in a coordinated way (Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 
1990; David, 1993). Obviously,  ex post  it is impossible to confirm or refute this 
statement empirically (Nelson, 1994a: 141). Under certain reasonable assumptions the 
model presented allows a counter-factual exercise comparing the performance of a 
dominant technology at the time when it becomes the standard and the hypothetical 
performance that the other alternatives coexisting with it or preceding it would have 
achieved if they had been adopted by an equal number of users. Column 10 (FIT_ST, 
ST
jST
t F  ) of Appendix 2 shows the actual fitness of the technological standard (column 2, 








those coexisting with or preceding the technology when it became the standard would 
have achieved (column 12, ID_BAT) had it been adopted by an equal number of users. 
It can be seen that in a significant
35 number of cases FIT_BAT exceeds FIT_ST, which 
leads us also to accept the second part of Hypothesis 1. 
 
As described earlier, on Anderson and Tushman’s (1990) view of the technology cycle, 
the transition between two standards is usually presented as the result of a technological 
discontinuity. In Foster’s terms (1986), there needs to be a “jump” of a certain order of 
magnitude between two S -shaped technology performance curves. Other authors have 
also suggested that it is necessary for there to be a significant improvement in the 
performance of an alternative to the standard in order to overcome the inertia of the 
system and initiate the transition from a locked-in technology to a new one (Grove, 
1996; Drucker, 1993). A number of empirical studies have tried to quantify this order of 
magnitude in specific industries and historical circumstances. One frequently cited 
example is that of David (1985), who concluded that 20-30% savings were insufficient 
to cause a transition from the QWERTY system to the Dvorak keyboard. However, we 
do not have a formal generalizable observation of this fact in technology transitions. 
This model enables us to examine statistically whether this is the case. It also makes it 
possible to measure, as will be shown below, the relationship between the magnitude of 
the improvement necessary to produce a technology transition and the different 
characteristics of the various industries in which a transition of this kind takes place 
(rates of innovation, barriers to entry, etc.) 
 
Hypothesis 2.  The emergence of an alternative to the locked-in technology 
(standard) that offers a sufficient improvement  in its characteristics (technology 
supply side), can lead the cumulative endogenous phenomena in the industry, 
which derive from the presence of increasing returns to adoption, to break with 
the standard and trigger the transition towards the next standard, without the need 
for intervention from outside the industry. 
 
Proof. Column 15 of the table of results in Appendix 2 shows, for each standard, its 
susceptibility to changes in supply ( jST dco ), previously defined as the magnitude of the 
necessary improvement in performance for an alternative technology to break its 
dominance (percentage variation in 
ijR
t F  and 
ijST
t F  at time  r t ). In an interval of 
confidence of 95% for the average between 17.07 and 32.78, the variable   jST dco  takes 
an average value of 24.93% in the base scenario, with a standard error of 3.94. 
According to results of a T -test (t=6.330; bilateral significance < 0.01) the average of 
the sample is statistically non-zero and the value 0  is outside the confidence interval. In 
other words, the model confirms Hypothesis 2: the emergence of an alternative 
                                                 
35 I t i s not, however, a  statistically significant number of cases.  In column 8 of Appendix 2 the 
dichotomous variable FST_FB1 = 1 when FIT_BAT > FIT_ST and = 0 otherwise.  According to the 
results of a non-parametric (binomial) analysis of proportionality on FST_FBI which does not allow us to 
state that the proportion of zeroes is different from that of ones for any reasons other than chance 
(bilateral asymptotic significance = 0.644).  Given that FIT_BAT and FIT_ST are distributed normally, 
we also performed a T-test for independent samples (for this purpose the variable FST_FB2 was created, 
with values 1 and 2 for each group) throwing up an equivalent result as that in the previous comparison 
(t=-1.408; sig. bil.=0.161).  At all events, to accept this second part of H1 it is enough to demand that 




technology to the locked-in technology (standard) which presents a sufficient 
improvement in its characteristics (in this base scenario, of the order of 25%) can cause 
the system to escape the lock-in endogenously (technology supply side). 
 
However, the evidence (Kemp, 1997: 281; Cowan and Hulten, 1996) reveals that a 
technology standard’s loss of the dominant position is not always solely d ue to the 
emergence of an alternative offering significantly better performance. To obtain a more 
realistic view of the internal processes explaining the dynamics of diffusion and the 
succession of standards, the proposed model also incorporates the importance of 
possible changes on the demand side, which it represents as changes in the preferences 
of the possible adopters. 
 
Hypothesis 3.  A sufficient change in the average preferences of potential 
adopters regarding the features of technologies (technology demand side), can 
lead the cumulative endogenous phenomena in the industry, which derives from 
the presence of increasing returns to adoption, to break with the standard and 
trigger the transition towards the next standard, without the need for intervention 
from outside the industry.. 
 
Proof.  Column 16 of the table of results in Appendix 2 shows, for each standard, its 
susceptibility to changes in demand ( jST dcd ), defined above as the magnitude of the 
necessary change in user preferences to break its dominance (see  table 1 ). Within an 
interval of confidence of 95% for the average between 2.84 and 3.95, the variable  
jST dcd  takes an average value of 3.40%, with a standard error of 0.28. According to 
results of a T -test (t=12.261; bilateral significance < 0.01) the average of the sample is 
statistically non-zero and the value zero is outside the confidence interval. In other 
words, the results of the model confirm H3: a sufficiently large change in the average 
preferences of potential adopters regarding technology features (in this base scenario, of 
the order of 3.5%) can cause the system to escape the lock-in endogenously (technology 
demand side). 
 
We will now look at the final objective of this study. To identify and evaluate the 
relationships between the main characteristics of the industry and the attributes of the 
technology standardization process (Table 1), six different sensitivity
36 analyses were 
carried out on the effects of incremental modifications in the parameters  T l ,  r ,  ß,  P l , 
s and  c  on the variables 
ST
0 t , 
ST f , 
jST v , 
jST d , 
jST p , 
jST dco , and 
jST dcd . Table 2 shows 





                                                 
36 Five values were taken for each parameter analysed and 30 simulations performed for each value (in 
total, 150 simulations for each analysis), holding the rest of the parameters unchanged and using the same 




Table 2. Summary of the results of the sensitivity analysis 
(**significant relationship with a level of confidence of 99%; * ditto for 95%) 
    Effect on the variable 
    ST
0 t  
ST f   jST v   jST d  
jST p   jST dco   jST dcd  
T l   b   0,076  -0,482   0,076  -0,441  -0,615  -0,121   0,046 
  t    0,688  -4,995**   0,688  -4,423**  -7,014**  -1,096   0,418 
r   b  -0,525   0,308  -0,585   0,335   0,524   0,013  -0,106 
  t   -7,011**   3,672**  -8,196**   4,039**   6,994**   0,143  -1,211 
ß  b  -0,215  -0,183  -0,632  -0,499   0,519  -0,552   0,051 
  t   -1,589  -1,342  -5,873**  -4,154**   4,379**  -4,778**   0,356 
P l   b   0,580   0,308   0,383   0,450   0,407   0,014  -0,471 
  t    7,226**   3,288**   4,208**   5,108**   4,527**   0,144  -5,424** 
s  b   0,179  -0,207   0,179   0,651  -0,010   0,076   0,166 
  t    2,020*  -2,346*   2,020*   9,521**  -0,114   0,850   1,866 












































  t   -3,623**  -1,742  -3,623**  -4,030**   2,129*   1,168   0,313 
 
Certain industries show greater dynamism than others in terms of the introduction of 
new technological innovations in their p roduction processes. According to the 
(significant) results of testing the sensitivity of  T l , in industries (or in phases of the 
lifetime of an industry) with a high  innovation rate the standards show a tendency to 
appear with less often, have a shorter duration and achieve a smaller share (Table 2 and 
Figure 4). The existence of a larger number of alternatives, and the faster rate of 
renewal, makes it difficult for any of them to achieve sufficient market share to enable 
them to differentiate themselves from the rest. Any advantage a technology achieves is 
slight, and is soon threatened by the emergence of new alternatives which may prove 
more attractive. 
 
   
( 1 T l = )  ( 5 T l = ) 
Fig. 4. Sensitivity analysis of  T l , innovation rate 
(showing only range ends; typical results; time course of market shares) 




The presence of increasing returns to the adoption of technology is greater in productive 
sectors in which technology is integrated and systemic in nature, has a long history and 
special infrastructure requirements. The significant results of the sensitivity of  r  reveal 
that in industries (or in phases of the lifetime  of an industry) with a higher average rate 
of increasing returns to adoption, standards show a tendency to appear earlier and more 
often, develop more rapidly, last longer and achieve a larger market share (Table 2 and 
Figure 5). As might be expected, in a new test of the consistency of the model, a greater 
intensity of the factors we have argued are the source of the phenomenon investigated, 
results in an intensification of the phenomenon. The sign of the relationships has been 
discussed sufficiently over  the course of the study, and is consistent with the empirical 
evidence. Also, we have confirmed in numerous experiments that in the presence of 
constant returns to adoption ( 0 r = ) no standards appear in the model (or they do so only 
exceptionally in the early periods). 
 
   
( 0 r = )  ( 1 r = ) 
Fig. 5. Sensitivity analysis of r , increasing rate of return 
(showing only range ends; typical results; time course of market shares) 
 
The frequency with which production technologies are renewed varies between different 
industries as a function of the rate at which plant and equipment becomes obsolete and 
of the cost of their replacement. The (significant) results of an analysis of the sensitivity 
of  ß show that in industries (or in phases of the lifetime of an industry) with a higher 
frequency of technology renewal  (due to the faster rate of obsolescence and/or lower 
cost of changing technology), standards show a tendency to develop more rapidly, last 
for a shorter time and achieve a larger market share (Table 2 and Figure 6). When firms 
want or have to (and are able to) renew their plant and equipment more frequently, the 
process of adhesion to an alternative may be accelerated and intensified, although the 
limited loyalty of adopters makes standards short-lived. Proof of this is the additional 
result showing that in industries with a greater frequency of technology renewal, 
standards are more vulnerable to improvements in the features offered by alternative 




   
( ß=0)  ( ß=1) 
Fig. 6. Sensitivity analysis of  ß, frequency of renewal 
(showing only range ends; typical results; time course of market shares) 
 
Some industries are more accessible than others to new firms that want to enter and 
establish themselves in the sector. The (significant) results of examining the sensitivity 
of  P l  reveal that in industries (or in phases of the lifetime of an industry) with lower 
barriers to entry  for users, standards show a tendency to appear later and less often, 
develop more slowly, last for a shorter time and achieve a smaller market share (Table 2 
and Figure 7). As might be expected, given the heterogeneity of the adopters, the larger 
the number of adopters the harder it is to converge on a first standard. However, once a 
given user base has been established, the flow of new entrants is readily channelled 
towards the agreement established by the previous users, strengthening its reach and 
duration. The results also show that standards in accessible industries are more likely to 
succumb to changes in users’ preferences. It may be deduced that, given the constant 
renewal of the user base, the standard is more likely to strengthen its position if the 
heterogeneity of the adopters’ preferences remains relatively stable. 
 
   
( 5 P l = )  ( 25 P l = ) 
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis of  P l , rate of entry of adopters 
(showing only range ends; typical results; time course of market shares) 




Industries in which, for v arious reasons, there is less competitive pressure, show lower 
rates of exit by firms. The (significant) results of the sensitivity analysis of  s reveal that 
in industries (or in phases of the lifetime of an industry) with higher  survival r ates 
among users, standards show a tendency to appear later and less often, develop more 
slowly and last for a longer time (Table 2 and Figure 8). As in the previous analysis, 
given the heterogeneity of the adopters, the larger the number of adopters the harder it is 
to converge on an initial standard. However, in this case, under the (restrictive) 
assumption made in the model that users’ preferences remain constant, there is greater 
certainty of stability of the heterogeneity of the user base, and thus greater duration and 
lower frequency of replacement of standards. 
 
   
( 5 s = )  ( 25 s = ) 
Fig. 8 Sensitivity analysis of  s, survival rate 
(showing only range ends; typical results; time course of market shares) 
 
Reasons intrinsic to the technologies (complexity, observability) or the nature of the 
industry (geographic dispersion, transparency) may imply different degrees of 
communication of experience between users and potential adopters. The significant 
results of the sensitivity of  c  reveal that in industries (or in phases of the lifetime of an 
industry) with a higher degree of  communication between users, standards show a 
tendency to appear earlier, develop more rapidly, last for a shorter time and achieve a 
larger market share (Table 2 and Figure 9). A higher degree of communication of 
experiences reduces uncertainty and reduces the information search costs while also 
ensuring potential users are more knowledgeable about the technology. Consequently, 
initial convergence around an alternative, and successive agreements, are reached easily 
and are deep. However, the reduced uncertainty also enables adopters to recognize and 
back new alternatives early on, which means that standards in this type of industry do 




   
(c=0)  (c=1,6 ) 
Fig. 9. Sensitivity analysis of c , rate of communication 
(showing only range ends; typical results; time course of market shares) 
 
As we hope to have shown, within its limitations, this relatively simple model enables a 
broad and consistent characterization or taxonomy of the relationships between the 
circumstances of an industry and the attributes of the processes of technological 
standardization operating in it. The results of the simulation have allowed us to 
corroborate a number of intuitions from economics while drawing attention t o less 
obvious relationships, suggesting possible lines of empirical research to confirm and 
expand on the conclusions obtained. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Conventional models of technology diffusion and standardization have typically 
focused on the question of the  rate of diffusion at which  one new technology is fully 
adopted. The model presented here provides a broader approach to the process of 
technological change, from the perspective of the  extension  of the diffusion of  multiple 
alternative technologies, and the related phenomenon of standardization. 
 
Experience shows that no standard remains in place in an industry indefinitely, and it is 
unusual for a technology standard to achieve total diffusion. By contrast, in reality, over 
a sufficiently long horizon it is possible to observe a succession of standards of differing 
degrees that coexist with less successful alternative technologies, which may survive for 
varying lengths of time in niche markets. The proposed model makes it possible to show 
with greater detail than conventional “all-or-nothing” models (which, moreover, usually 
focus on the competition between just two alternatives) the reality of a dynamic of 
transition between unstable equilibria in an industry divided at all times between 
multiple available a lternatives, all with different levels of adoption at each moment in 
time. 
 
It is a recurring theme in the literature on technology diffusion that in the presence of 
increasing returns to adoption the market may become locked-in in favour of one of the 




that there are no alternatives to the winning technology that would have had lower unit 
costs if they had achieved an equivalent position of market domination. The model has 
allowed us to examine the hypothesis that in an industry characterized by increasing 
returns to adoption of technology, over a sufficiently long time horizon, we will witness 
a succession of multiple alternative equilibria (standards), which cannot be anticipated 
and are not necessarily Pareto-optimal. 
 
Various authors have also suggested that it is necessary for there to be a significant 
improvement in the performance of an alternative to the standard to overcome the 
inertia of the system and initiate the transition from a locked-in technology to a new one 
(supply side). Although a number of empirical studies have attempted to quantify this 
order of magnitude in specific industries and historical moments, there is no formal or 
generalizable confirmation o f this fact in technology transitions. The evidence also 
shows that the loss of dominant position by a technology standard is not always solely 
due to the emergence of an alternative technology offering significantly better 
performance. It may also be due  to changes on the technology  demand side. The 
proposed model has also allowed us to examine the hypothesis that either a  sufficient 
improvement in the features  of alternative technologies or a  sufficient change in the 
preferences of potential adopters regarding the features of technologies can lead the 
cumulative endogenous phenomena in the industry, deriving from the presence of 
increasing returns to adoption, to break with the standard and trigger the transition 
towards the next standard, without the need for intervention from outside the industry. 
 
Most research into factors influencing the technology diffusion process has concentrated 
on the characteristics of the technologies and the characteristics of adopting firms. In the 
literature there are, however, relatively few approximations to the way in which the 
aggregate characteristics of the  industry or sector affect the process of technological 
diffusion (and in particular the dynamic of standardization). The few sectorial studies 
that exist, most of which are empirical, generally use average characteristics of the firms 
belonging to the sector and also offer somewhat inconclusive and even at times 
contradictory results. The model proposed here has enabled a wide-ranging and 
consistent characterization or taxonomy of the relationships between the circumstances 
of an industry and the attributes of the technology standardization processes taking 
place within it. It has also corroborated a number of intuitions from economics, while 
drawing attention to some l ess obvious relationships which may be an interesting focus 




Appendix 1. Experiment using the base scenario, 150 simulations of 50 iterations each, using different random seeds in each simulation 
(sample of the first 10 simulations) 
   
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
SIM  ID_ST   TST  TFST  CA01  CA02  CA03  CA04  CA05  FIT_ST  FIT_BAT  ID_BAT  FST  VST  DST  PST  ID_TRET  TR  DCO  DCD 
1  1  3  50  0,254  0,451  0,101  0,157  0,329  0,650  0,692  3  1  0  47  0,988         
2  1  2  50  0,058  0,422  0,478  0,366  0,269  0,716  0,576  2  1  0  48  0,989         
3  2  2  11  0,469  0,390  0,272  0,370  0,397  0,722  0,674  3  3  1  9  0,847  9  12  -2,425  6,722 
3  9  16  20  0,443  0,127  0,416  0,041  0,190  0,488  0,769  8  3  11  4  0,667  17  24  -2,425  3,307 
3  9  47  50  0,443  0,127  0,416  0,041  0,190  0,508  0,866  28  3  40  3  0,688         
4  3  4  10  0,191  0,410  0,134  0,350  0,292  0,746  0,723  5  2  3  6  0,667  12  9  1,980  4,213 
4  14  16  19  0,464  0,412  0,155  0,082  0,178  0,679  0,746  3  2  4  3  0,730  20  20  1,980  2,228 
6  1  28  34  0,244  0,264  0,440  0,185  0,208  0,499  0,781  14  2  27  6  0,713         
6  1  35  43  0,244  0,264  0,440  0,185  0,208  0,499  0,781  14  2  34  8  0,713         
7  13  15  18  0,188  0,282  0,405  0,418  0,486  0,579  0,699  2  1  4  3  0,667  20  24  56,295  6,936 
8  2  2  6  0,497  0,248  0,201  0,147  0,476  0,766  0,731  4  1  1  4  0,907  6  5  -5,472  2,659 
9  4  7  10  0,145  0,089  0,252  0,394  0,082  0,670  0,751  5  1  4  3  0,733  5  10  -2,368  5,021 
10  1  21  32  0,261  0,144  0,388  0,124  0,333  0,538  0,782  8  2  20  11  0,737         
10  1  44  50  0,261  0,144  0,388  0,124  0,333  0,538  0,782  8  2  41  6  0,737         
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
 
Equivalence between statistical abbreviations (SPSS) and model variables 
SPSS  Model    SPSS  Model 
SIM  Number of simulation    VST  Speed (v
jST )* 
ID_ST  Identifier of standard technology     DST  Duration (d
jST
) 
TST  Standard emergence (
ST
0 t )    PST  Depth ( p
jST
) 
TFST  Standard end    ID_TRET  Identifier of challenging technology  
CA01  Starting level of performance of
jST T in criteria 1 (
0 ,1
jST
Ak Ck = )    TR  Replacement time (  r t ) 
CA02  ditto  2 k =     DCO  Susceptibility to changes in supply (dco
jST
)* 
CA03  ditto  3 k =     DCD  Susceptibility to changes in demand ( dcd
jST
)* 
CA04  ditto  4 k =        
CA05  ditto  5 k =        
FIT_ST  Actual fitness (
j
t F ) of the technology standard at the time 
ST
0 t        
FIT_BAT  ditto of the BAT at the time 
ST
0 t        
ID_BAT  Identifier of best alternative technology       
FST  Frequency ( f
ST




Appendix 2. Data for the first standard recorded in each simulation, filtered out from the general results of the 150 simulations 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
SIM  ID_ST   TST  TFST  FIT_ST  FIT_BAT  ID_BAT  FST_FB1  FST  VST  DST  PST  ID_TRET  TR  DCO  DCD 
3  2  2  11  0,722  0,674  3  0  3  1  9  0,847  9  12  -2,425  6,722 
4  3  4  10  0,746  0,723  5  0  2  3  6  0,667  12  9  1,980  4,213 
7  13  15  18  0,579  0,699  2  1  1  4  3  0,667  20  24  56,295  6,936 
8  2  2  6  0,766  0,731  4  0  1  1  4  0,907  6  5  -5,472  2,659 
9  4  7  10  0,670  0,751  5  1  1  4  3  0,733  5  10  -2,368  5,021 
14  3  1  10  0,557  0,464  2  0  1  0  9  0,862  7  11  49,904  7,169 
15  2  4  7  0,787  0,786  3  0  2  3  3  0,563  3  6  2,374  7,302 
16  2  6  10  0,698  0,684  8  0  3  4  4  0,616  12  10  60,655  4,035 
18  1  4  8  0,576  0,685  2  1  3  3  4  1,000  2  7  46,575  4,162 
20  2  4  10  0,607  0,626  5  1  2  3  6  0,667  7  9  -3,865  2,202 
22  4  5  12  0,717  0,616  5  0  1  3  7  0,925  13  13  69,454  2,959 
25  3  9  12  0,635  0,721  7  1  2  7  3  0,638  10  12  -2,188  5,854 
26  3  4  19  0,747  0,725  6  0  1  3  15  0,922  22  19  17,263  3,743 
30  3  4  9  0,726  0,761  9  1  1  3  5  0,837  16  9  19,336  2,321 
31  4  5  15  0,717  0,687  6  0  1  3  10  0,871  13  15  39,368  0,436 
32  4  10  13  0,668  0,719  6  1  5  4  3  0,679  14  13  5,282  6,904 
32  14  16  19  0,663  0,773  19  1  5  5  3  0,727  1  19  5,282  1,538 
34  2  3  9  0,695  0,588  5  0  2  2  6  0,837  9  8  87,255  0,919 
35  2  3  8  0,679  0,724  3  1  4  2  5  0,807  3  7  6,848  1,321 
36  2  5  11  0,701  0,761  4  1  2  3  6  0,818  5  10  12,775  2,789 
41  2  4  14  0,748  0,654  1  0  2  3  10  0,976  9  13  11,420  2,365 
45  3  4  9  0,704  0,649  5  0  1  3  5  0,898  6  8  51,055  0,210 
46  2  4  9  0,626  0,531  1  0  3  3  5  0,929  3  8  20,278  1,638 
49  4  4  9  0,447  0,635  2  1  4  3  5  0,923  8  8  41,994  1,955 
52  8  8  11  0,698  0,833  10  1  1  4  3  0,701  12  11  61,404  2,419 
53  3  7  11  0,813  0,670  5  0  2  4  4  0,797  10  10  20,627  0,098 
54  3  1  6  0,608  0,539  2  0  2  0  5  0,735  4  5  21,849  6,746 
55  2  3  9  0,660  0,662  3  1  2  2  6  0,814  9  8  -19,459  2,747 
58  9  8  12  0,672  0,691  11  1  1  4  4  0,737  12  12  26,455  0,806 
60  2  5  16  0,786  0,754  3  0  1  3  11  0,905  13  17  5,424  1,533 
62  4  7  12  0,622  0,547  3  0  1  5  5  0,659  8  12  0,819  4,425 
65  4  3  6  0,628  0,677  2  1  2  2  3  0,617  6  7  6,033  3,715 
66  2  4  7  0,846  0,786  3  0  3  3  3  0,986  4  6  13,720  0,602 
68  3  15  22  0,651  0,682  16  1  1  11  7  0,847  21  21  12,689  4,994 
 




SIM  ID_ST   TST  TFST  FIT_ST  FIT_BAT  ID_BAT  FST_FB1  FST  VST  DST  PST  ID_TRET  TR  DCO  DCD 
 
70  4  6  10  0,680  0,622  5  0  3  3  4  0,752  10  10  46,450  6,625 
71  2  10  28  0,554  0,738  6  1  2  9  18  0,656  24  31  -23,571  2,387 
72  2  4  11  0,657  0,695  4  1  2  3  7  0,928  6  10  40,860  2,030 
74  2  4  13  0,751  0,641  4  0  2  3  9  0,945  7  13  8,857  5,524 
75  3  4  11  0,819  0,764  6  0  2  3  7  0,917  13  10  130,657  3,408 
76  3  3  7  0,566  0,522  1  0  1  2  4  0,574  6  7  -17,671  0,363 
77  2  3  6  0,630  0,828  4  1  2  2  3  0,667  4  6  16,443  0,970 
81  2  8  11  0,648  0,697  8  1  1  6  3  0,568  3  10  -8,824  8,004 
85  1  4  8  0,623  0,537  2  0  2  3  4  0,745  4  7  5,982  2,645 
87  2  4  15  0,655  0,489  1  0  2  2  11  0,883  8  15  10,751  3,546 
88  5  7  10  0,657  0,682  3  1  1  6  3  0,853  8  10  4,455  5,038 
90  2  2  25  0,753  0,735  1  0  2  1  23  0,647  1  25  -4,323  8,656 
99  3  3  8  0,815  0,683  5  0  1  2  5  0,826  6  8  109,492  3,465 
100  2  3  7  0,658  0,641  1  0  1  2  4  0,914  4  7  107,583  5,249 
101  1  4  8  0,581  0,624  2  1  3  3  4  0,897  2  7  -0,567  1,866 
102  2  4  11  0,736  0,745  3  1  1  3  7  0,928  8  12  84,478  0,966 
105  4  8  12  0,734  0,741  9  1  1  4  4  0,699  12  12  31,504  3,319 
106  1  4  7  0,680  0,752  2  1  2  3  3  0,833  2  6  2,380  2,418 
109  9  10  13  0,580  0,622  4  1  1  4  3  0,707  11  13  46,684  2,310 
114  11  10  13  0,638  0,735  10  1  1  4  3  0,575  16  19  -19,264  0,083 
115  3  6  12  0,717  0,830  5  1  2  4  6  0,910  11  11  30,238  3,597 
120  3  4  19  0,747  0,725  6  0  1  3  15  0,922  22  19  17,263  3,743 
121  5  7  10  0,619  0,733  7  1  1  6  3  0,600  7  9  4,143  3,941 
126  4  4  8  0,638  0,612  3  0  2  3  4  0,671  8  8  66,036  1,554 
128  2  4  10  0,702  0,664  5  0  2  3  6  0,813  11  9  28,221  1,091 
132  2  5  9  0,771  0,631  7  0  2  4  4  0,789  11  10  58,527  4,515 
133  1  4  7  0,559  0,668  2  1  3  3  3  1,000  2  6  22,446  0,380 
136  3  7  10  0,751  0,782  2  1  2  4  3  0,750  1  9  8,860  4,980 
137  2  2  8  0,687  0,694  3  1  2  1  6  0,831  7  8  -7,965  2,964 
140  2  5  10  0,676  0,733  5  1  1  4  5  0,679  4  10  69,611  8,182 
141  2  7  11  0,756  0,669  3  0  2  6  4  0,753  3  11  35,131  1,998 
142  3  5  8  0,756  0,743  7  0  3  4  3  0,651  6  7  3,273  0,394 
144  1  4  8  0,590  0,921  5  1  1  3  4  0,844  2  26  -1,299  1,951 
146  3  5  14  0,716  0,734  5  1  2  3  9  0,875  12  13  67,962  1,493 
147  2  4  10  0,730  0,568  3  0  2  2  6  0,966  7  10  74,271  2,691 
148  1  3  6  0,592  0,557  2  0  2  2  3  0,582  5  7  0,580  6,149 
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Typical results of the model (base scenario)   RAM technologies (Nadejda y Ausubel, 2002) 
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